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MOORE V. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 21 September 1990. 
912F.2d 789 
A time charterer is not responsible for injuries sustained by a debarking passenger despite actual or constructive knowledge that a haz­
ardous condition exists. 
FACTS: Appellant Mack J. Moore (Moore) was a production worker 
employed by ODECO Oil and Gas Co. (ODECO). ODECO and 
Phillips Petroleum Co. (Phillips) owned an unmanned fixed platform 
located on the Outer Continental Shelf off the coast of Louisiana. 
ODECO entered into a time charter agreement for the vessel M/V C­
DICTATOR (DICTATOR) with the vessel owner, Co-Mar Offshore 
Marine Co. (Co-Mar). Moore was transported aboard the Dictator to 
the fixed platform. To reach the platform, Moore swung from a rope 
attached to a beam extending from the top deck of the platform. The 
rope broke and Moore suffered a shoulder injury. This method of 
debarkation is normally used. 
ODECO, as Moore's employer, paid Moore worker's compensa­
tion. Moore then sued ODECO under the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, 35 U.S.C. §905(b) (LHWCA), alleging 
that ODECO as time charterer knew that the rope was rotten, thereby 
breaching the duty of due care owed to him as a passenger. 
ISSUE: Is a time charterer liable to a passenger under the LHWCA 
when the debarking passenger is injured due to a hazardous condition 
of which the time charterer has actual or constructive knowledge? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established 
that the LHWCA is applicable because the platform in question lies on 
the Outer Continental Shelf. The court stated that under §5(b) a cov­
ered person who is caused injury by the negligence of a vessel may 
bring an action against the vessel as a third party. 33 U.S.C. §905(b). 
The court had previously held that an injured worker has standing to 
sue the time charterer when the time charterer is also his employer. 
The court went on to state that appellant must first establish that a 
duty of due care was owed to him by ODECO acting as the time char­
terer, because as an employer, ODECO is only obligated to pay an 
employee worker's compensation when that employee is injured. The 
court further found that since no express agreement was created to fur­
ther extend the traditional sphere of control and responsibility of a 
time charterer, it could only hold ODECO liable under §5(b) if the 
duty breached lay within the traditional control of a time charterer. 
The court noted that a time charterer is responsible for the routes it 
chooses to follow, the cargo it chooses to store and its destination, 
while the vessel owner remains liable for the ship's seaworthiness, the 
crew's negligence and the safety of its embarkation/debarkation sys­
tem for passengers. Therefore, the court found that either Co-Mar, as 
vessel owner, or ODECO, as the employer, were responsible for 
Moore's unsafe debarkation. The court stated that ODECO, as 
employer, controlled the physical condition of the rope and could be 
charged with knowledge of its impairment. The court further found 
that ODECO is liable under worker's compensation, which it was 
already paying to the appellant. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit 
found Co-Mar to be responsible for the safe debarkation of passen­
gers. The court found that in either event, the responsibility for safe 
debarkation is not a traditional responsibility of a time charterer under 
5(b) and that no cause had been shown to warrant an extension of the 
traditional duties as noted. 
Judy L. Berberian '91 
SISSON V. RUBY 
United States Supreme Court, June 25, 1990 
110 S. CT. 2892 (1990 WL 84059) 
A fire on board a pleasure yacht docked at a marina, on "navigable waters," which causes damage to neighboring pleasure craft and the 
marina, is a "potential hazard to maritime commerce arising out of an activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional mar­
itime activity" and therefore, admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §1331(1). 
FACTS: Everett Sisson owned the Ultorian, a 56 foot pleasure yacht. 
On September 24, 1985, while the Ultorian was docked at a marina on 
Lake Michigan, a navigable waterway, a fire erupted in the vessel's 
washer/dryer unit. The fire destroyed the Ultorian and damaged sever­
al neighboring vessels and the marina. The owners of the neighboring 
vessels and the marina filed claims against Sisson for over $275,000 
in damages. Invoking the Limitation of Liability Act 46 U.S.C. 
§183(a), Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in 
federal district court to limit his liability to $800, the salvage value of 
the Ultorian after the fire. Sisson argued that the federal court had 
maritime jurisdiction over his limitation of liability action under 28 
U.S.C. §1331(1). The district court disagreed, and dismissed the peti­
tion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Sisson sought reconsidera­
tion on the ground that the Limitation of Liability Act independently 
conferred jurisdiction over the action. The district court denied 
Sisson's motion. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed, holding that neither 1331(1) nor the Limitation of Liability 
Act conferred jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
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ISSUES: 1) Whether a limitation of liability suit brought in connec­
tion with a fire on board a pleasure yacht docked at a marina on navi­
gable waters falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. 2) Whether the Limitation of Liability Act 46 U .S.C. § 183(a) 
independently confers admiralty jurisdiction over the suit. 
ANALYSIS: The United States Supreme Court held that a fire on 
board a pleasure vessel docked at a marina, on navigable waters, 
which causes damage to neighboring pleasure vessels and the marina, 
was within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal district court. Prior 
to the decision of this case, admiralty jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331(1), was proper if the incident at issue: 1) occurred on navigable 
waters and 2) bore a significant relation to traditional maritime activi­
ties. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 266 
(1972). In deciding the case at bar, the Supreme Court expanded upon 
the two part test in order to clarify the scope of admiralty jurisdiction. 
The Court began its opinion by reviewing the development of the 
jurisdictional test. Prior to the decision in Executive Jet, admiralty 
jurisdiction was determined largely by the application of the "locali-
